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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 18-2785
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
VICTOR SANTIAGO-RIVERA,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. 3:17-cr-00006-001)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
________________
Submitted Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a)
July 10, 2020
Before: MCKEE, BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 26, 2021)
________________
OPINION*
________________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

McKEE, Circuit Judge
Victor Santiago-Rivera appeals his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(felon in possession of a firearm), arguing that the district court improperly allowed the
Government to use convictions that were more than ten years old to impeach his
testimony. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.1 An
abuse of discretion occurs when “no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s
view.”2 The district court denied Santiago-Rivera’s motion in limine to preclude the
admission of his prior criminal record based upon Santiago-Rivera’s representation that
he would limit any entrapment defense to the firearms charge. However, the district
court reasonably concluded that defense counsel’s cross-examination of the
Government’s informant suggested that the robbery charges were also the result of
entrapment.3 In addition, on direct examination, defense counsel questioned SantiagoRivera about his convictions that were older than ten years in a manner that suggested
that he lacked a predisposition to commit the attempted robbery.4 Thus, defense

1

United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id. (quoting United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009)).
3
App. 240 (“Why is it that you are trying to get Mr. Santiago-Rivera to commit to the
robbery on January 6th?”).
4
The elicited testimony is as follows:
Q[:] As time went on and you were getting closer and closer to this date of
January 6th, were you intending on going through with the robbery?
A[:] No, I wasn’t, because that’s not me, like that’s not me.
App. 381.
2

2

counsel’s questions “opened up the door” to cross-examination regarding SantiagoRivera’s prior convictions.5
Santiago-Rivera also asserts that the admission of stale convictions deprived him
of a fair trial. He argues that allowing the jury to learn of those convictions penalized
him for strategic choices even though he understood that the Government would not
attempt to introduce those convictions if he did not assert an entrapment defense to the
robbery charge.
We have long recognized the doctrine of curative admissibility: “once a party has
introduced inadmissible evidence that may create a false impression, an opposing party
may thereafter introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut or explain the prior
evidence.”6 Here, defense counsel attempted to walk a fine line by asking questions
about prior convictions in a manner that suggested that Santiago-Rivera would not have
committed the robbery he was charged with. This choice may well have been a
reasonable strategy, but it opened the door to cross-examination about those convictions.
The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was proper for the Government
to walk through once the door was opened.
Finally, Santiago-Rivera renews the argument presented in his motion in limine
that his stale convictions were inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b)
and 609(b). The district court never ruled on that argument because the Government
represented that it would not attempt to admit the evidence if Santiago-Rivera did not
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6

App. 263.
United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 256 (3d Cir. 1999).
3

present an entrapment defense to the robbery charge he was facing. Defense counsel did
not renew this objection when the court subsequently allowed the inquiry based upon
defense counsel’s questioning of the informant and Santiago-Rivera. Accordingly, we
review only for plain error.7
As explained above, Santiago-Rivera’s predisposition to commit the robbery was
called into question by defense counsel’s inquiries. Rule 404(b) allows evidence of prior
crimes to be admitted for a purpose other than proving character. Such “evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”8
Rule 609(b) prohibits the use of a witness’s prior convictions for impeachment
purposes, if more than ten years have passed, unless “(1) its probative value . . .
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect” and “(2) the proponent gives an adverse
party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it . . . .”9
Given defense counsel’s line of questioning, Santiago-Rivera’s prior convictions
for theft and burglary were admissible under Rule 404(b) to show predisposition.10
Moreover, since the Government clearly put Santiago-Rivera on notice of its intent to
admit the stale crimes if he raised a defense of entrapment to the robbery charge, they
were not barred by Rule 609.

7

United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2009).
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
9
Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).
10
United States v. Ward, 793 F.2d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1986).
8
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We therefore decline to find plain error and affirm his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g).
II.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s ruling to admit
Santiago-Rivera’s prior felony convictions that occurred over ten years ago.
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